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The uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, and elsewhere have been credited in part to the creative
use of social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. Yet the information policies
of the firms behind social media can inhibit activists and empower authoritarian regimes.
Analysis of Facebook’s response to Egypt’s ‘‘We Are All Khaled Said’’ group, YouTube’s
policy exemption for videos coming from Syria, Moroccan loyalist response to the online
presence of atheists, and the activities of the Syrian Electronic Army illustrate how
prohibitions on anonymity, community policing practices, campaigns from regime loyalists,
and counterinsurgency tactics work against democracy advocates. These problems arise
from the design and governance challenges facing large-scale, revenue-seeking social media
enterprises.
doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2012.01636.x
Social media platforms are utilized extensively by activists in a variety of political
systems. Their role in the evolution of events during the ‘‘Arab Spring’’ has been
widely discussed, but it is also important to recognize that social media are used
to serve the political goals of reformers, revolutionaries, and authoritarian regimes
alike. At the same time, Facebook, Google, Twitter, and the other firms must view
social media in commercial terms as products and services with customers and users.
In this article we examine four cases in which social media design and policies created
tensions between the sociopolitical uses by activists and the commercial interests of
the platform owners.
Information technologies have become indispensable to reformers, revolutionar-
ies, and contemporary democracy movements. They serve as venues for the shared
expression of dissent, dissemination of information, and collective action. In the
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Middle East, they offered a sphere of public life in which Arab youth could reach
beyond the control of older generations and build links with transnational networks
of advocates who provide a partial counterbalance to state power (Aday & Livingston,
2008; Armbrust, 2007). Social media in the Middle East and elsewhere undermine the
territorial, coercive, and social underpinnings of despotic governments by exposing
and breaking the state’s power to silence popular grievances and to criminalize
opposition (Masoud, 2011).
Social media provide the tools for organized dissent yet can constrain collective
action. The architecture of social media shapes its uses and limits at two levels.
First, the application’s programming code sets the range of usability. Thus, ‘‘Codes
constitute cyberspaces; spaces enable and disable individuals and groups. The selec-
tions about code are therefore in part a selection about who, what, and most
important, what ways of life will be enabled and disabled’’ (Lessig, 2006, p. 88).
‘‘Code is law,’’ as Lessig (1999) famously declared, because it permits and forbids
the uses set out by an application’s sponsoring firms (Grimmelmann, 2004). Second,
users’ actions are enabled and constrained by company policies and user terms gov-
erning, among other things, intellectual property, community policing provisions,
anonymity, and offensive and violent content. These are enforced through code,
by actual programming design as well as by firms’ adjudication and actions against
violations.
Firms focus primarily on increasing users, improving usability, boosting revenue
streams, avoiding negative public relations, seeking access to new markets, and
protecting other larger classes of nonactivist users. These privatized goals of platform
owners and developers can conflict with their use as tools for civil society and popular
mobilization. Changes in architecture may thus adversely impact activists.
This article centers on specific developments—namely evolving policies, func-
tionalities, and user guidelines—that affect the key social media activists employ.
These architectural changes alter the communicative structure of social media sites,
ultimately affecting who connects with whom. To complicate matters further, states
are catching up on social media, using them to gather intelligence and spread
proregime propaganda. While state powers have some leverage over the companies,
their infiltration of the platforms is another threat to activists.
Social media and the activist toolkit
Debate regarding the influence of online activism in revolutions in the popular
press pits advocates of the Internet’s emancipatory promise (Shirky, 2008, 2011)
against those who warn of negative consequences, including its use in state repression
(Morozov, 2011) or encouraging ‘‘slacktivism,’’ or superficial, minimal effort in
support of causes (Gladwell, 2010). While the Arab Spring was labeled a ‘‘Facebook
revolution’’ by some, others have pointed to core causes such as unemployment
and state repression. Still others argue that by placing too much emphasis on the
role of social media, popular commentaries both mystify its effects and ignore the
deeper historical roots of rebellion in the pre-Internet era (Anderson, 2011; Aouragh
316 Journal of Communication 62 (2012) 315–329 © 2012 International Communication Association
W. L. Youmans & J. C. York Social Media and the Activist Toolkit
& Anderson, 2011). For their part, communication researchers have gravitated away
from polarized perspectives, focusing instead on the more specific ways social media
are used and what the effects of those may be (e.g., Bennett, 2003; Howard, 2010).
The Arab Awakening, as some call it, presents a particularly interesting set of cases
for examining theoretic perspectives on the relationship between social media and
collective action (e.g., Bimber, Flanagin, & Stohl, 2005; Flanagin, Stohl, & Bimber,
2006; Segerberg & Bennett, 2011). Much of the initial research and analysis finds that
social media played an important role in the collective actions that resulted in the
overthrow of the governments of Egypt and Tunisia’s revolutions (Iskander, 2011;
Kavanaugh, Yang, Sheetz, Li, & Fox, 2011; Khamis & Vaughn, 2011; Wilson & Dunn,
2011). According to Lynch (2011), social media contributed to collective action in four
ways: (a) by making it easier for disaffected citizens to act publicly in coordination;
(b) by creating information cascades that bolstered protesters’ perceptions of the
likelihood of success; (c) by raising the costs of repression by the ruling regimes; and
(d) by dramatically increasing publicity through diffusion of information to regional
and global publics. No one social media platform served all of these functions all of
the time, but instead platforms provided a variety of affordances that were important
at different times, sometimes providing forums for early critiques of the regimes
and later helping to form public opinion and provide logistical assistance to those
organizing protests. (Aouragh & Anderson, 2011; Howard & Hussain, 2011).
Our approach begins by noting that social media technologies, as well as their
governance and management, and thus, their uses by both activists and regimes, are
still evolving. Programmed orders of functionality, or code, embody the governing
architecture of social media applications to a degree not recognized in the behavioral
research on new media (Mansell, 2006). The main social media platforms are
institutions that shape interactions within activists’ collective action spaces. Changes
in platform architecture may introduce new or expand previous constraints for
activist users, thus affecting the risks and effectiveness of their efforts.
This focus contributes to the concern with the impact of the political economy
of media corporations on content production and circulation (Dahlberg, 2005;
Mansell, 2004), as well as the power of states to influence media. It accepts power,
ownership, and control as important factors shaping social media development and
use governance. Although we accept the disruptive potential of social media, our
goal is to highlight the mismatch between the commercial logic of platforms such
as Facebook and the needs of activists using social media as public information
infrastructure. The fundamental problem is that social media governance, both in
terms of code-as-law and the rule of policies and user terms, is driven by necessary
commercial considerations, namely monetization. Companies must appeal to broad
classes of users and advertisers, which both can help activists and lead to policy
changes that constrain them. Social media operators are not inherently antiactivist by
agenda or driven by ideological impetuses. As the platforms were not designed to cater
to activist users, changes in rules and architectures can have negative, unintended
consequences for activists.
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Interpretive case analysis
We present analyses of four cases in which social media architecture, policies, and user
terms obstructed or complicated activist uses. Rather than seeking generalizations or
tests of theories of user behavior, our focus is on the practices of specific institutions.
Interpretive case study analysis is particularistic and emphasizes both thorough
description and drawing fresh insights (George & Bennett, 2005; Yin, 2003).
The cases were selected according to the following criteria: They involved one
of the primary social media platforms (Google, Facebook, Twitter, or Yahoo!
and their subsidiaries); credible and verifiable documentation was available; and
interference with activist purposes was apparent. The case study approach was useful
because it allowed us to weave several sources of evidence together. These included:
(a) document analysis of their user terms and policy guidelines; (b) documented
changes to their technical infrastructures; (c) official and unofficial statements by
social media spokespeople and heads; (d) advocacy platforms of nongovernmental
organizations; and (e) personal correspondence with activists.
As profit-seeking entities, the companies that develop and control social media
platforms must retain and gain users, develop new revenue streams, and avoid
liabilities and bad publicity. When state power also comes to bear on them, the
utility of social media to activists could decline. Four case studies demonstrate how
prohibitions on anonymity and certain content types, and the use of community
policing of offensive material and greater infiltration by government agents can lessen
social media’s utility. States and the private sector are allied against online anonymity
because it impairs governance and monetization. And yet, anonymity, as well as the
overarching concern of privacy, is of central importance for activists and dissident
journalists using social media.
Case study 1—‘‘We Are All Khaled Said’’: Banning anonymous users
The now-famous ‘‘We Are All Khaled Said’’ Facebook page was created by a
pseudonymous user’ ‘‘ElShaheed’’ (‘‘the martyr’’) in June, 2010. It became a central
platform for debate and helped mobilize many during the Egyptian uprising.
‘‘ElShaheed’’ is now known to have been a former Google executive, Wael Ghonim.
One reason for using a pseudonym was his personal security. In the first week
after the protests broke out, Ghonim told Newsweek ‘‘I’m taking as much measures
as I can to remain anonymous. But of course I’m scared’’ (Giglio, 2011). Other
benefits of a pseudonym, according to Ghonim, included avoiding the factionalism
of Egyptian oppositional politics. Ghonim administered the account until November
2010, when—just before Egyptian parliamentary elections—Facebook deactivated
Ghonim’s pseudonymous account and the page. A Facebook spokeswoman said it
‘‘was removed because of a violation of our terms and not because of contact from
any government’’ (Coker, Malas, & Champion, 2011). Facebook officially prohibits
the use of pseudonyms in accounts. The page was relaunched eventually. An Egyptian
activist suggested social media platforms should ‘‘allow anonymous accounts, even if
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it means putting a small symbol stating that it is one’’ (Egyptian activist 3, personal
communication, 6 August 2011). Privacy on social networks is about controlling
who precisely gets access to one’s personal account. As one activist said, ‘‘The main
concern is about my privacy and safety of information I provide, and how far will
the website fight for users privacy’’ (Egyptian activist 1, personal communication, 14
July 2011). Yet, many users show lax attitudes toward protecting theirs’ (Debatin,
Lovejoy, Horn, & Hughes, 2009). People share text updates, photographs, videos, and
other content within their networks, but often lack awareness of precisely with whom
their information circulates or who else can gain access to their accounts, which for
activists can risk personal security (Faris, Roberst, Heacock, Zuckerman, & Gasser,
2011). This can be reduced by education in online literacy, but other privacy risks
are built into social media governance and can come to the fore during moments of
policy changes.
Both Facebook and Google have been subject to controversies around privacy.
In 2007, Facebook launched the Beacon service, which morphed user content into
advertisements shared with users’ friends without consent (Brodkin, 2009). Facebook
was slow to implement privacy settings to begin with and even then privacy options
did not always function correctly (Debatin et al., 2009). Google settled a class-
action lawsuit brought by 31 million users of Google’s Buzz social networking
service, after the service publicly exposed users’ e-mail contacts without permission
(Grimmelmann, 2010). This particularly angered journalists, activists, lawyers, and
others whose networks were highly sensitive information. Citizen journalists were
especially vulnerable since they lacked the (albeit limited) protection of institutional
affiliation. Even without professional credentials, they played a role as information-
gatherers during the Arab uprisings (Khamis & Vaughn, 2011) and likely will in
future revolutions when traditional media are heavily manipulated or have scant
access.
Allowing anonymity in social action is arguably essential for the protection of
basic rights such as liberty, dignity, and privacy, yet both states and the private sector
push for real identity requirements (Kerr, Steeves, & Lucock, 2009, pp. 439–440).
In the United States, various social media firms have attempted to limit anonymity
despite its support in American jurisprudence and political history (Wallace, 1999).
Many bloggers and activist social media users particularly seek anonymity as a mean
of protection from retaliation (Vie´gas, 2005).
At the same time, online anonymity has been used by some as a cover for
harassment, fraud, and illegal activity. For example, a blogger known as ‘‘the Gay Girl
in Damascus’’ became a media source on protests in Syria and was later found to be
a middle-aged American man living in Scotland (Addley, 2011). Anonymity can also
encourage ‘‘trolling,’’ the uncivil use of discussion forums to provoke, degrade, and
distract others. Facebook designers argued publicly for curbing online anonymity
as a way to prevent these types of abuses (Zhuo, 2010). Facebook’s terms of service
therefore limit users to one profile and require that ‘‘users provide their real names
and information.’’
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The commercial interest is that real identities are easier to monetize. They are
needed for online commerce as well as for generating the valuable consumer data
that Facebook collects. CEO, Eric Schmidt, claimed that Google’s Real Name policy
was important for providing users access to a wide array of products and services.
With real names, he said, ‘‘we could you know bill them, you know we could have
credit cards and so forth and so on’’ (Pfanner, 2011).
Another emerging issue is how social media platforms attempt to police content
in congruence with their stated community standards. Facebook’s ‘‘Statement of
Rights and Responsibilities’’ (revised April 26, 2011) states that users will ‘‘not bully,
intimidate, or harass any user’’ or ‘‘post content that is hateful, threatening, or
pornographic; incites violence; or contains nudity or graphic or gratuitous violence.’’
Not all social media is so prohibitive. Twitter’s Terms of Service only warn users
they ‘‘may be exposed to Content that might be offensive, harmful, inaccurate, or
otherwise inappropriate.’’
Case study 2—YouTube videos from Syria: Banning offensive content
YouTube has been cited as a vital platform in the Arab Spring uprisings, particularly
in Syria, where the absence of professional journalists has created a need for citizen
video (Amos, 2011). Many videos from Syria were extremely graphic, capturing
the regime’s use of violence to quell protests. YouTube took down a popular video
showing the battered body of a young boy, Hamza Ali al-Khateeb, who was reportedly
tortured and killed by authorities in Jiza. Those trying to view the video found a
message saying, ‘‘This video has been removed as a violation of YouTube’s policy on
shocking and disgusting content’’ (Melber, 2011). The video was restored, but only
after a journalist of The Nation brought it to the attention of YouTube staffers.
YouTube includes a warning against graphic images in the terms of service, but
sets specific standards through ‘‘Community Guidelines.’’ During the Arab Spring,
there was a shift in policy enforcement at YouTube. In May 2011, while addressing
the platform’s policies in light of video from Libya, YouTube Manager of News,
Olivia Ma, said that, although such violence violates their community guidelines and
terms of service, making it subject to removal, ‘‘we have a clause in our community
guidelines that makes an exception for videos that are educational, documentary, or
scientific in nature . . . So, we will actually adjust our policies in real time to adapt
to situations’’ (Plesser, 2011). This was done on a case-by-case basis, and the Arab
uprisings were granted exemption.
For activists, documenting and circulating video and images that demonstrate
regime violence can help recruit new members to collective action efforts. For
instance, in 2007, Egyptian antitorture activist, Wael Abbas, posted on YouTube a
video of two police officers sodomizing an Egyptian bus driver. Although the video
brought about a public outcry and the conviction of the officers, YouTube removed
the video and deactivated Abbas’s account. They restored it eventually. Even when
videos are restored, however, the impact on behalf of activists may be diminished by
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the loss of viewers and because the video may be overtaken by more recent events.
Furthermore, content standards can be difficult to adjudicate. When sectarian divi-
sions overlap with power differences, as in Bahrain and Syria, antiregime rhetoric may
include language derogatory of entire groups, such as Sunni Muslims in Bahrain or
Alawites in Syria. These can easily be construed as incitement, promoting terrorism or
hatred.
Most platforms utilize community policing mechanisms, in which account
holders may report others for terms of service violations, including offensive
content or unwanted contact (‘‘spam’’). Given the enormous amount of data,
this crowd-sourced monitoring of community standards lowers the costs of policy
enforcement significantly. Some platforms additionally employ automated content
controls to remove or prevent the posting of certain words, phrases, or links.
Although these strategies can be very effective, for example, at combating overzealous
e-marketers, they can also harm activist users. During the Arab Spring for example,
state agents and regime supporters used such flagging to report and have removed
content generated by activists. This reflected a longstanding problem by which
certain, offended communities exploit these functions to censor views they oppose.
Case study 3—The antiatheist Facebook campaign: Community policing
abuse
Campaigns for the specific purpose of getting certain content or accounts taken down
have emerged. They exploit reporting mechanisms and pressure firms directly. An
Arabic-language group called ‘‘Together to close all atheist profiles on Facebook’’
began identifying Arab Facebook users known to be atheists and calling on group
members to report those users for violating the site’s identification policy (York,
2010). Although there is no proven link with the activities of those using that group
page, it is worth noting that Kacem El Ghazzali, a Moroccan blogger who is identified
as an atheist, had his account removed. Other atheists’ accounts were blocked, as
well. A group page calling for the separation of religion and state in the Arab world
was also taken down, though it was reinstated within a few days. Community policing
practices can easily be turned against dissidents with unpopular positions or members
of minority identity groups.
There are, however, some safeguards in place to protect against orchestrated
abuse. YouTube staffers have stated, for example, that the reports of users who
frequently create erroneous reports will be negatively ‘‘weighted’’ so as to ensure
fair enforcement of their rules. Other social networking platforms may have similar
mechanisms and be cognizant of orchestrated and selective reporting. Importantly,
however, no social media site has yet posted explicit policies against malicious
reporting and the process for appealing actions taken remain unclear and weak.
Yet orchestrated manipulation of reporting mechanisms continues to have grave
consequences for activists, especially when attacks are timed so as to disrupt planned
events crucial to the activists–such as demonstrations. Governments such as Tunisia
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reportedly pushed loyalists to engage in reporting campaigns (‘‘Les ‘ennemis de la
Tunisie’. . . ,’’ 2010). Government agents in Sudan posted pornography to protest
pages and then reported them to Facebook (Boswell, 2011).
Automated social media protocols for discouraging ‘‘spammers’’ often work
against the interests of activists. For example, Tunisian activist Rafik Dammak found
his account disabled in mid-2010, with a message explaining, ‘‘We will not be able
to reactivate [your account] for any reason, nor will we provide further explanation
of your violation or the systems we have in place. This decision is absolutely final.’’
Dammak suspected he was reported by regime loyalists, but a Facebook official said
Dammak had sent too many friend requests that were rejected, and ignored warnings
about spam (MacKinnon, 2010). In another case, Ahmed Maher, an administrator
of the Facebook group for the Egyptian April 6 group, found that his account had
been disabled because of his high volume of correspondence (Wolman, 2008). In
both cases, the automated systems were thwarting attempts to reach as many people
as possible, the very thing that activists want social media to do for them.
In attempting to stifle communications amongst activists, governments have
essentially three tactics from which to choose: censorship, surveillance, and propa-
ganda (Morozov, 2011). While the first generation of content controls was covert,
a new generation is making Internet censorship the global norm (Deibert, Palfrey,
Rohozinski, & Zittrain, 2008). Furthermore, while first-generation controls denied
access through basic means, next-generation techniques are more sophisticated.
The ability of a government to shut down Web sites, or indeed, the Internet
during a protest is one tool available to states (Howard & Hussain, 2011). Indeed,
following Egypt’s footsteps, both Libya and, briefly, Syria attempted to cut off Internet
access (Cowie, 2011a, 2011b). In the case of Libya, this tactic was largely ineffectual
due to the country’s low Internet access. Syria’s leader Bashar al-Assad, perhaps
recognizing the failed approaches of the Tunisian and Egyptian regimes, chose to
unblock Facebook, Blogspot, and YouTube, which were blocked since 2007, in order
to increase surveillance. This move was shrewd, showing how a government can use
social media to repress.
During the Arab protests, each government approached social media differently,
in attempting to quell protests. In Tunisia, where access to various digital commu-
nication tools had been cut off for years (Deibert et al., 2008), activists succeeded
in utilizing digital tools to organize and disseminate information about protests,
using proxies to circumvent censorship. Facebook was never blocked there. Egypt’s
Mubarak took a different approach, first blocking popular tools Facebook and Twit-
ter, then shutting down access to the Internet (Perez, 2011; Richtel, 2011). Mubarak’s
ploy seemed to have the opposite effect than what was intended, possibly resulting in
more citizens taking to the streets. In the end, the week-long Internet blackout did
not end protests. As with Iran, crowd-sourced regime supporters in Bahrain gath-
ered information on online dissenters (Bahraini activist, personal communication
by phone, 6 August 2011). Regimes have adapted activists’ digital tools to combat
protests through counter mobilization and to enhance surveillance and prosecution
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abilities. In 2010, following the previous summer’s protests in Iran, the government
asked citizens to identify the faces of protesters in images posted online (Athanasiadis,
2010). Sudan also used protesters’ Facebook pages to gather intelligence, spread dis-
information, and disrupt demonstrations (Boswell, 2011). Repressive regimes are
demonstrating learning curves when it comes to limiting the usefulness of social
media for activists. Just as in Bahrain and Egypt, Syrian authorities arrested Facebook
users and forced them to turn over sign-in information. They have also reportedly
used Facebook accounts featuring photographs of attractive women in attempts to
entrap activists (Wood, 2011).
Case study 4—The Syrian Electronic Army: Authoritarian social media use
The ‘‘Syrian Electronic Army’’ is a hacker group whose aim has been to bring
down, deface, or otherwise target sites that host antiregime content. The group
denies affiliation with the regime of Bashar al-Assad, claiming on its Facebook page
that its founders are ordinary Syrians fighting against ‘‘fabrications and distortions
of events in Syria.’’ The Army’s targets have included Oprah Winfrey, journalist
Nicholas Kristof, and President Barack Obama, among others (Noman, 2011). The
group posted dissidents’ contact information, threats against critics, and proregime
messages such as ‘‘I love Bashar’’ on social network sites (Karam, 2011). It has also
conducted denial of service (DoS) attacks aimed at bringing down the Web sites of
news organizations, and defaced many others with proregime images and texts. The
Army’s actions led President al-Assad to thank them in a speech, hailing them as a
‘‘real army in virtual reality’’ (al-Assad, 2011).
The responses to these actions by social media platform managers has been
mixed. Facebook, for instance, removed a number of pages belonging to the Syrian
Electronic Army, but allowed many others to remain. When the Army attempted to
drown out opposition messages on Twitter by using automated accounts to bombard
users with photographs of Syrian landscapes using the hashtag #Syria, the company
responded by removing the account’s tweets from hashtag search results, but did not
remove them from their profile pages.
These examples illustrate how the social media tools that facilitate protest can also
be used by repressive regimes and their supporters to dampen and disrupt opposition.
But activists in the Arab Spring have also adapted to the state’s infiltration of social
media in several ways. In Bahrain, for example, activists have used closed direct
messaging and chats instead of public walls and profiles on Facebook and Twitter to
communicate (Bahraini activist, personal communication by phone, 6 August 2011).
Similarly, Syrian activists have developed strategies to prevent detection, advising
other users to erase contacts with ‘‘any name that sounds Islamic,’’ as well as to
remove content that refers to revolution (Sayed, 2011). Activists in Egypt coordinated
contingency plans to have others delete their accounts in the case they go missing.
Government pressure can also be directed at the social media companies
themselves. Most major social media platforms are based in the United States and
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are therefore subject to U.S. laws. Although laws regulate the export of a wide variety
of materials and products, including certain technologies such as cryptographic
software, to repressive regimes, there is little legal guidance or protection for social
media companies.
As a consequence, social media companies regularly receive government requests
to provide user data, or to remove content. Companies typically comply rather than
face penalties when this occurs as a result of a valid legal request. If a request for data
or content removal occurs outside of the home jurisdiction, the company may refuse
to submit the request. However, because refusing such requests may result in being
banned or blocked, states can exert leverage over social media even when they lack
legal grounds for doing so. Business considerations may trump civic considerations.
In some cases companies receiving illegal or extralegal requests have chosen to disclose
the requests to the public. Google, for instance, makes information about requests
for content removal and user data public in its Transparency Report. The majority
of companies do not, however. Of the companies providing social network services,
only Google and Twitter publicly report such government requests. Companies face
perhaps their biggest challenge when they have employees and capital in a given
country. They are more easily coerced into compliance with laws that contradict
global standards and principles of free expression or privacy.
There is growing documentation of the risks to individuals when social media
companies cooperate with repressive regimes. In 2005, for example, Chinese journalist
Shi Tao was convicted of leaking state secrets and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment.
Key evidence cited by the prosecution in his trial included information about Shi’s
Yahoo! account, provided to the Chinese State Security Bureau by the company itself
(MacKinnon, 2007). And in 2008, following the arrest of Moroccan engineer Fouad
Mourtada for creating a fake Facebook profile of a member of the country’s royal
family, civil liberties groups claimed that Facebook may have handed over the user’s
information to the Moroccan government (Vara, 2008).
Beyond these dramatic cases, the state’s power over social media will eventually
be seen in the form of content restrictions. Google, for example, chose to launch its
localized Google.cn search engine in 2006, shortly after opening their first office in
China. Chinese content regulations prohibited certain types of ‘‘sensitive content’’
including information on the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre, the banned Falun
Gong, and prodemocracy movements (Deibert et al., 2008). The photo-sharing site
Flickr, owned by Yahoo!, restricts content to users in certain countries. Microsoft’s
Bing search engine restricts search results for users in various countries, including
the entirety of the Arab world (Noman, 2010).
Conclusion: Agency against the social media constraints on collective action
Social media firms will continue to limit anonymity, prohibit certain content, and
depend on community policing, while at the same time governments undoubtedly
will seek to increase their leverage against firms and pursue strategies of infiltration
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and surveillance. There are at least six strategies that activists might use to maintain
or even enhance social media as tools for collective action.
First, activists can exert their power as consumers by jumping to new social media
platforms en masse. Over time, this line of reasoning goes, the market provides
applications with the security and functionality that activists require. The downside
of this approach is that platforms optimized for activists may be so niche that it is
more difficult to broadcast their concerns widely and mobilize networks of casual
sympathizers.
Second, activists can try to use the law by applying extant legal doctrine to
create new remedies against social media companies that put users at extra risk.
Consumer safety provisions in American law, such as product liability law, would
seem to have some parallels, even if there are important differences. Legal scholars
like Grimmelmann (2010, p. 827) do not argue for a direct application of laws
governing manufacturer liability for harms stemming from the products’ uses, but
instead advocate greater dialogue between ‘‘two bodies of law that have a common
history and more in common than scholars and lawyers sometimes realize.’’
Third, activists can appeal directly to the governments in the United States and
other countries that claim to be committed to an open Internet and democratization.
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (2010) has expressed Internet freedom as
an aim of American foreign policy; she called for companies to ‘‘take a proactive
role in challenging foreign governments’ demands for censorship and surveillance.’’
Exhortation is unlikely to be enough. To be effective, this approach will require the
development of a regulatory apparatus in the United States and elsewhere.
Fourth, activists can work to advance industry self-regulation. One such effort is
the Global Network Initiative in which a diverse group of experts and stakeholders
have negotiated a collaborative approach to protect and advance freedom of expres-
sion and privacy in the ICT sector. Although it has produced extensive statements of
principle and implementation guidelines, the initiative has only attracted three ICT
companies after 4 years of effort (Kopytoff, 2011).
Fifth, they can pressure large social media companies via long-term, iterative,
incremental advocacy. In the words of one Egyptian activist, this approach advocates
a ‘‘system in which the power shifts toward the users rather than the powerful private
companies running the network’’ (Egyptian activist 2, personal communication, 14
July 2011). MacKinnon (2011) argued that achieving a ‘‘citizen-centric’’ Internet will
demand a broad and sustained movement.
Finally, activists can embrace the development of what Zittrain (2009) calls ‘‘civic
technologies.’’ These technologies are not constrained by government or commercial
gatekeepers, but instead are untethered platforms for the generation of further innova-
tions. Civic technologies depend on an open architecture that is free to accept whatever
structures and content users wish to build. Civic technologies such as Wikipedia are
not only open to activists, but have themselves become sites of political contestation.
Although social media firms made some exceptions for reformers during the
Arab Spring, their policies and the architecture of their products will increasingly
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complicate collective action efforts. Nonetheless, pressures by users have and will
continue to force adjustments in design and policy. Social media researchers must
consider the tensions between activists, governments, and firms’ commercial interests.
This interplay not only has obvious civic and political consequences, but also creates
a rich context for the re-examination of social media and collective action.
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社会媒体和激进分子的工具包：现代社会运动的用户协议、企业利益和信息基础建设 
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【摘要：】 
人们认为突尼斯，埃及以及其他地方的暴动部分是因为对社会化媒体平台，如
Facebook和 Twitter创造性的运用。然而，社交媒体背后的公司信息政策可以压制社会
活动者和赋予独裁政权权利。本文通过分析 Facebook对埃及“我们都是萨伊德”组织隐
私问题的反应，YouTube对来自叙利亚视频的反应，摩洛哥效忠者对阿拉伯无神论者出
现在网络上的回应，以及叙利亚电子军队的活动，说明禁止匿名、社区监控行为、专制
效忠者的运动，以及平叛策略是如何阻止民主人士的。大规模的、以商业为目的的社会
传媒企业所面临的设计挑战是导致这些问题出现的原因。 
Les médias sociaux et le coffre à outils de l’activiste : les contrats d’utilisation, les intérêts 
commerciaux et l’infrastructure informationnelle des mouvements sociaux modernes 
William Lafi Youmans 
Jillian C. York 
 
Les soulèvements en Tunisie, en Égypte et ailleurs ont en partie été attribués à l’utilisation 
créative des plateformes de médias sociaux comme Facebook et Twitter. Pourtant, les politiques 
informationnelles des entreprises qui sont derrière les médias sociaux peuvent entraver les actions 
des activistes et donner du pouvoir aux régimes autoritaires. Une analyse de la réaction de 
Facebook face aux inquiétudes quant à la confidentialité concernant le groupe égyptien « We Are 
All Khaled Said » (Nous sommes tous Khaled Saïd), de la réaction de YouTube aux vidéos en 
provenance de Syrie, de la réaction des loyalistes marocains à la présence en ligne d’arabes 
athées et des activités de l’Armée électronique syrienne illustre comment l’interdiction 
d’anonymat, les pratiques de surveillance d’une communauté, les campagnes de loyalistes 
autoritaires et les tactiques de contre-insurrection jouent en défaveur des partisans de la 
démocratie. Ces problèmes découlent des défis de conception auxquels font face les entreprises 
de médias sociaux à grande échelle et à but lucratif. 
 
Mots clés : médias sociaux, contrats d’utilisation, sites de réseautage social, printemps arabe, 
action collective, confidentialité, mouvements sociaux 
Soziale Medien und der Werkzeugkasten des Aktivisten: Zustimmung der Nutzer, 
Firmeninteressen und die Informationsinfrastruktur moderner sozialer Bewegungen 
 
Die Aufstände in Tunesien, Ägypten und anderswo wurden zum Teil dem kreativen Umgang 
mit sozialen Medienplattformen wie Facebook und Twitter zugeschrieben. Allerdings kann 
die Informationspolitik der Firmen hinter den sozialen Medien Aktivisten beschränken und 
autoritäre Regierungen bemächtigen. Die Analyse der Reaktionen von Facebook auf 
Bedenken hinsichtlich der Privatsphäre seitens der ägyptischen „Wir sind alle Khaled Said“-
Gruppe, YouTubes Antwort auf den Zustrom von Videos aus Syrien, die Antwort 
marokkanischer Loyalisten auf den Onlineauftritt atheistischer Araber und die Aktivitäten der 
syrischen elektronischen Armee zeigen, wie Verbote bezüglich der Anonymität, politische 
Praktiken auf Community-Ebene, Kampagnen von autoritativen Lokalisten und 
Widerstandstaktiken gegen die Befürworter der Demokratie arbeiten. Diese Probleme rühren 
von den designbezogenen Herausforderungen, die an große, profitorientierte soziale 
Medienunternehmen gestellt werden.  
 
Schlüsselbegriffe: soziale Medien, Nutzerbestimmungen, soziale Netzwerkseiten, Arabischer 
Frühling, kollektives Handeln, Privatsphäre, soziale Bewegungen 
 
 
소셜미디어와 행동주의자 도구들: 사용자 동의들, 기업적 관심들, 그리고 현대 사회적 
운동의 정보 기반들 
William Lafi Youmans 
 
Jillian C. York 
 
요약 
튜니지아, 이집트, 그리고 여러 곳에서의 대중항쟁은 페이스북과 트위터 같은 소셜미디어 
플랫폼의 창의적 사용에 부분적으로 기인하였다고 할 수 있다. 그러나 소셜미디어 
회사들의 정보 정책들은 행동주의자들을 억제하였고 권위적 정권에 힘을 보태주었다. 
이집트의 We Are All Khaled Said 그룹과 관련된 개인정보노출 우려에 대한 페이스 북의 
대응, 시리아로부터 오는 비디오들에 대한 유튜브의 대응, 무신론 아랍인들의 온라인 
노출에 대한 모로코의 반응, 그리고 시리안 군대의 반응들에 대한 분석은 어떻게 익명성의 
금지들, 커뮤니티 경찰 실행들, 권위주의적 충성자들로부터의 캠페인, 그리고 반대중 
봉기적 전략들이 민주주의 지지자들에 반해 이루어 지는가를 잘 보여주고 있다. 이러한 
문제들은 수익을 추구하는 소셜미디어 기업들이 해당 소셜미디어의 디자인을 통해 
통제하려 하기 때문에 나타나는 것이다. 
Los Medios Sociales y el Juego de Herramientas del Activismo:  Los Acuerdos de los 
Usuarios, los Intereses Corporativos, y la Infraestructura de la Información de los 
Movimientos Sociales Modernos 
 
William Lafi Youmans 
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor 
 
Jillian C. York 
Electronic Frontier Foundation 
 
Resumen 
 
Las revueltas en Túnez, Egipto, y en cualquier otro lugar han sido debido en parte al uso 
creativo de las plataformas de los medios sociales tales como Facebook y Twitter.  Aún  
las políticas de información de las firmas detrás de los medios sociales pueden inhibir a 
los activistas y dar poder a los regímenes totalitarios.  Un análisis de la respuesta de 
Facebook a las preocupaciones sobre la privacidad con el grupo de Egipto “Somos Todos 
Khaled Said”, la respuesta de YouTube al suministro de videos que venían de la 
respuesta leal de Siria y Marruecos a la presencia online de Árabes ateos, y las 
actividades de la Armada Electrónica de Siria ilustran cómo las prohibiciones sobre la 
anonimidad, las prácticas de las políticas comunitarias, las campañas  de los autoritarios 
leales, y las tácticas de la contra insurgencia trabajaron en contra de los defensores de la 
democracia.  Estos problemas emergen de los desafíos del diseño que enfrentan las 
compañías buscadoras de ingresos de los medios sociales de larga escala. 
